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ABSTRACT

City planners should take on a "maieutic" role, which is to say that they should encourage wide participation in a process that elicits and enlists the latent knowledge and desires of all citizens in a city-building effort. Planners must try to obtain a sense of (1) what the everyday life of people living in and using cities is like, and (2) the levels and qualities of the institutionalized portions of the lives of city dwellers. Planners should be politically minded professionals who have an alternative vision of city planning. Instead of speaking of city-rebuilding, renewal, or redevelopment, planners should speak of city-building, city-creation, and city-construction. At the center of this alternative vision are cooperative human projects that can function as effectively as, and more humanely than, traditional institutional organizations. An example can be found in the situation of contemporary british workers. The company or office has become a social center as well as an office of production. The personnel office, secretaries, mailrooms, and office canteens have informally taken over the social roles of the clergy, the extended family, and the great houses that used to form the basis of the old English village. However, even these new, informal institutions at the office do not allow workers to participate as total people because they are too structured. When city planners begin to act maieutically, they will concern themselves with opening up all institutions to participation: the company, the school, the local government, and the local economy. (Author/BC)

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Participation Through Maieutic Planning

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Our central thesis in this essay is that community cannot be obtained through the usual or even unusual kinds of programs designed to increase participation by "citizens" in planning or other processes without fundamentally changing the institutionalized nature of modernity. People can be induced and helped to participate, and institutionally-opened and integrated communities can thereby be obtained, by professionals such as planners opening their own institutions to real participation by people therein, in a manner that we term maieutic planning. It is possible and necessary for people to join with planners in city-building rather than in renewal or reconstruction, but only through a process of weaving a richer everyday life fabric that encompasses and dominates the increasingly partializing, fragmenting specialized institutions.

We outline an argument in this essay that can be summarized in the following points. For a long time the ratio of costs to benefits of increasingly refined institutionalization and the corollary development of the welfare service state was favorable for most human beings in Western societies. That ratio has changed such that costs now exceed benefits, increasingly so over time. In fact, there has occurred a situation wherein

institutionalization has made it increasingly impossible to solve major human problems because their contents and contours have become unrecognizable. This has happened especially in regard to human problems in cities. Pains are felt but their sources are not understood, except superficially. Even the character of cities is generally misunderstood. In a pseudo-complex reality, politicians as well as urban planners do next to nothing with problems of cities, of people in cities, except to increase those problems. Their roles as well as those urged on them by reformers lead to an unnecessarily elitist planning activity, and to a citizen participation process that is trivial.

It is possible for city planners as well as for urban and regional planners to adopt a maieutic planning approach that involves a non-trivial participatory, community-constructing approach. That is an approach that we shall explain below. It depends on the participants therein having a different understanding of the nature of cities than is generally held today, especially by professional urbanists. It depends also on planners understanding that theirs is a political activity, although not that of the conventional "administrative" or even political-administrative but essentially technical role for which planners presumably have special professional competence.

Political scientists might well try to help urban planners in such difficult political tasks. They might help design and initiate processes leading to more open institutions. They might try to do so with planners and ordinary people. Through evaluative research and critical theory, political

scientists might help to demonstrate how present conceptions and practices of urban planning are bound to be irrelevant to or exacerbate human problems in cities. They even might dare, with planners, to become politicians and to open their own profession to the maieutic approach.

* * *

We shall not argue the fundamental proposition that we have for some time been in an increasingly negative or undesirable cost-benefit ratio/situation regarding modern development. We simply assert it here.[1]

We do need to say how it is that major human problems are not defined correctly and therefore are approached wrongly under the conditions of modern institutionalization. We shall, therefore, be suggesting something about why modern development is increasingly negative. We start by offering our understanding, our definition, of cities.

We read the history of cities to be the history of people living in a particular manner. That manner is one of living and exchanging everyday life experiences in a non-institutionalized form by people whose common spatial location comes to characterize those experiences as particular, to some extent or in some regards. A non-city differs from a city in so far as the city has a comparatively richer, more dense system of social experiences in everyday life time/space, in a given socio-cultural or historical epoch. Thus the dividing line between cities and non-cities might be substituted by a sense of more or less cityness.

Urban development, in contrast, can be defined without

reference to people as such, as a matter of physical, quantitative parameters. Such matters as size of population and numbers of buildings, the densities of people, and the like are defining dimensions. Institutional character may be regarded as important, as in the numbers of people working in occupations and industries not directly connected to farming.

In fact, the density of economic or social relations may be high or increasing with urban maturation or development while a city undergoes further development, is arrested in its development, or even degenerates. That will depend on what is happening to the web of social experiences that people are having, not as institutionally-defined people but in their everyday life domain. Institutional definitions of people are partializing definitions. People regard each other and themselves as functional identities in terms of particular institutions, whether economic, social, political, cultural, artistic, or whatever. If such institutionalization is having the consequence of increasing or enriching the social experiences of everyday life, where people are encountering each other as more integral persons rather than according to mere partializing institutional identities, urban and city development may be proceeding hand-in-hand. If it is having the opposite consequence, such that everyday life human experiences are becoming degraded or more sparse, then urban and city development may be in contradiction.

What of a situation wherein urban development is bringing with it the kinds of economic productivity and progress that is making it possible for people, however partialized compared to

the pre-industrial or pre-institutional period, to be more civil with each other in their everyday life space? Suppose that a contraction in everyday life space is occurring, so that more civility is happening but within the more narrowly defined political institutional space? Where people are not merely people but institutionally-defined, institutionally-partialized citizens and governors, such civility could be increasing among citizens themselves, and/or between citizens generally and those in the government, while decreasing in other domains or in the residual everyday life spaces.[2] What needs to be investigated or assessed in such circumstances is precisely what is happening to the everyday life experiences of people, so that we may know whether a city is developing or becoming a post-city part of a megalopolis or of a Buckminster Fuller kind of post-industrial world-as-urban-village utopia.

We shall not spend time on elaborating what we mean by everyday life experiences or everyday life time/space.[3] But the concept may be clarified if we elaborate a bit on the nature of cities in our view and in the views of most urban specialists, including political scientists. Certain features of life, of social life, need to exist for a place to be a city; or the more these features are present, the more a place is a city or more of a city. These features are as follows:

However stratified into classes or other groups, the members of a city need to have some values in common, values that concern their common life location and that cross-cut the class and/or other group differentiations. For that, and in

its own right, there needs to be direct linkages, channels that connect, and make interdependent, whether in hierarchical form or not, people who inhabit a given area, as another essential element of a city (or for adjudging places as more or less cities). Through those linkages or channels must flow communications between people, even if of different classes and groups, and no matter how those communications are conditioned by class or group relations. A sense of solidarity, of some kind of solidarity, in case of need is a characteristic embodying the shared value(s) as well as being implied by the interdependency relations and the intercommunications. That sense of solidarity has a form which gives a set of residents of a space a sense that they are members of a particular space, differentiated from members of other (particular and/or general) spaces. The life patterns of the persons of a given place constitute contributions by those persons to the characteristics that define the particular city, which characteristics in turn influence the life patterns of the city's members in a seamless web through time.

The concept of a city, or of more or less cityness, thus entails not physical parameters but parameters that refer to the system of social experiences and its conditions over time in various places, including density, strength, richness and other aspects of their contents and forms.[4] By social experiences we encompass the aesthetic facets of person-to-person and personal-only relations, including those specific to aspects of the physical environment. In this manner we try to heal

the encrusted division or duality between those who take a physical or geographical approach and those who take a social approach to understanding the city.[5] But the usual social approach is different from ours. Let us see how.

To most urban planners, social scientists, and, indeed, to most people including politicians, the city is an urbanized place understood in particular physical and social terms. The physical part of the formula of urbanization is the existence of limited, relatively fixed urban space. Growth of cities leads to or is a consequence, or both (in a circular or feedback process), of "competing demands for the one common feature of all cities, scarce urban space."[6] Even if the utilization of space can be increased vertically, within limits, for purposes of working and living, a defining condition of particularly the American urbanization process with the invention of high-rise construction material and methods and such mechanisms as the elevator, it is the special nature of physical space that sets the tone for much urban analysis. It is within and in reference to that space that people are crowded or not, that traffic is congested or chaotic or not, that people make their location decisions or try to. Location decisions and the resulting physical and social structures are the gist of urban or city planning concerns. Such planning involves precisely some kinds of efforts to interfere with or place constraints upon individual location (and relocation) decisions, on the assumption that "if left to themselves individuals will not make decisions which,

when looked at in aggregate, lead to a maximization of the collective welfare of the community."[7]

The social terms in which the city is approached are as particular and have already been implied. People are treated in one of several ways but usually not as persons involved in everyday life experiences. The city is envisaged, as is every other non-city living space, as consisting of a set of institutions within each of which, and taken all together, are sets of complex interdependencies characteristic of modern social systems. In fact, formerly isolable problems are imagined to have disappeared as genuinely urban problems have superseded them. The genuinely urban problems are precisely those having the "unique characteristic: they are highly interdependent."[8] We shall offer below another explanation for the disappearance of formerly isolable problems. But with the appearance of institutions as the major actors on the urban and city scenes in the dominant social approach have come institutionally-defined, partialized people.

Let us see how people emerge as epiphenomena or residuals from this institutional model of modernity. The influential Canadian urbanist N.H. Lithwick puts the modern wisdom in the following terms: Cities are urban systems. Urban problems are interdependent largely because "they are generated by the process of urbanization itself." The aforementioned competition for scarce urban space drives core prices upward and households outward.

Transportation, pollution and poverty problems flow

> from this. Contained with the process of urbanization, then, are the seeds of the majority of the problems found in the city...They are fundamental aspects of the growing city. As such, we might call them problems OF the city to distinguish them from the simpler IN the city problems.[9]

The policy approach taken both in Canada and the United States, at least, but also in such countries in Europe as Italy, is "to deal with each problem in isolation." Housing policy has succeeded in building (some) more houses but with the consequences of urban sprawl and difficult municipal fiscal situations. Transport policies have moved people faster, at least initially, but "have led to further sprawl, downtown congestion, pollution, and rapid core deterioration." And so it goes.

Urban policy concentrated unduly, according to Lithwick, on the one goal of economic development. This was made necessary by the

> "requirements of large-scale production and hence mass markets, industrial specialization and hence close inter-industrial linkages, and large and specialized labour and capital resources. Because all these can occur only in large dense centres, cities are the sine qua non for industrialization and economic development.[10]

And that has had the effect of subverting a number of other social goals. These include certain individual freedoms, such

as those of work, political action, and fundamental consumption choices. "Community" has suffered, as economic segregation and hard-core poverty have been the fate of the non-specialized. "Waste, built-in obsolescence, human redundancy" are all unwarranted and unwanted consequences for Lithwick and, indeed, for most people.

Lithwick's view, as that of most people, is essentially an institutional view. His is a world of economics, of transportation and house-building industries, and even of sociological categories. The people of the city are divisible into three socio-economic, essentially economic categories: the elite (the rich), the middle classes (those of middle levels of income), and the urban poor. Their problems are increasingly "social" as one descends that ladder, and increasingly "environmental" as one ascends it. That is, these different sets or groups of people understand their problems differently, and the elite have the ways and means of making sure that their conception prevails. What is it in this view with which we disagree?

It is that people are really caricatured, and the caricature is one set by the particular institutional understanding of people. Thus, people are rich, of average income or poor. Unfortunately this tells us not enough about the kinds and qualities, the contents and forms, of the human experiences that these people have with their different amounts of money and/or status and prestige and/or power. They are subject to and subject themselves to different modes and durations of daily--and holiday--transportation. But with what kinds of experiences and how are

those experiences congruent with or disjunctive to their lives? What is the everyday working and non-working portions of their lives like in terms of human experiences?[11] Is there anything about living in their cities, identified by particular names, that makes them in any significant sense members of that city?

We ask also because we are also told that so much of the real action, the real economic as well as political and cultural action, takes place outside of or regardless of particular city locations. But let us note again one of Lithwick's statements of the highly interdependent urban problems:

> Housing is related to transportation and land use; these affect the urban poor, the quality of the environment, and the fiscal resources of local governments; and these in turn have severe consequences for housing.[12]

People slip in but only as "the urban poor" or by some other particular institutionally-defining criterion or two.

The experiential everyday life of people in cities so slips from view that we do not know whether cities even exist anymore. This is the fundamental problem with the traditional approach to cities. There is an implicit assumption throughout Lithwick's analysis of Urban Canada that Canadian cities have become as increasingly important as has the urban fabric of Canada. With a highly developed urban fabric it is quite possible that cities have become less city-like, not because of the familiar urban problems but because of the common genesis of just those urban problems and of the decreasing cityness of

cities in North America, and especially in the United States.

What we mean is this. We concluded elsewhere that the United States is not a country of cities in crisis.[13] It is a country with often arrested and prematurely decaying cities, that have been in decline for a very long time. We mean those judgements not in terms of the usual declining population, declining economy parameters, or of rotting or deserted buildings; nor even of the more "social" indicators of people fleeing whole neighborhoods, of crime, delinquency or drug-taking. It is a country of cities perhaps more properly termed underdeveloped. These descriptive terms are meant to suggest an historically ever more constricted everyday life subject to the partializations, fragmentations and distortions of modern institutionalization.

Of course American urban sociologists have for a very long time identified the disintegration of ethnic subcommunities, of so-called natural communities, and of stable ethnic neighborhoods as the hallmark of modern urban development, starting with the Chicago school of urban sociologists with Park, Burgess, et al. They accepted almost as an article of faith that modern institutionalization had to mean the development of specialized exclusive projects marked by extensive voluntary associations and organizations. Rather impersonal, professional "communities" attached to institutions had to replace the more solidary, not so voluntary communities and sub-communities of early and middle-age industrialism.[14]

A more recent tradition of urban historical-social analysis, epitomized by the work of Sam Bass Warner Jr. and Richard Sennett,

is generating some revealing over-time pictures of American cities.[15] These are pictures of groups of people, of their perspectives and of aspects of the kinds and qualities of their lives in various American cities that reveal how a seemingly inevitable and certainly already happened history was not necessarily so. The kinds of privatism and politics that developed in Philadelphia, for example, do not seem to have been inevitable concomitants or corollaries of the development of the modern institutional urban-industrial society. What are needed, in fact, are even more broad-ranging historical stories combined with the sensitive works of the best novelists, historical and otherwise, to tell us even more about the qualities of everyday life in the American urban places, especially in the American cities. These reconstructions need to go as far back as possible but certainly must be initiated as soon as possible for more recent time periods.[16]

Our sense is that especially, but not exclusively, on the East Coast, the American patterns of mobility, especially of moving Westward but also of moving to the outskirts, or to small towns outside of but near cities, have had early and heavy consequences for the kinds of arrested or underdeveloped cities that characterize the United States. Obviously such a factor as the development of a national economy that is less dependent on particular city locations has played its part in contributing to the weakening of a city-based and city-oriented everyday life. The preoccupation of the political class with building a single polity, a continental nation-state, has also played its part.

But our point at this point is something other.

Our point is that we need to look again at the situation of American cities and through time by looking at the changing lives of their inhabitants, to understand when and where the present condition of institutional fragmentation and of more integral everyday life moments had its roots. It is important in this context to do "empirical" studies, meaning studies of most recent history that is still on-going, to determine the present condition of cities. Such a condition is assessable by understanding something more than we do now about various aspects of what we have been referring to as the system of social experiences (perhaps the word human or personal or even interpersonal is better than social). The focus must be on people, on the whole, whose institutional lives cannot be understood by trying to add the bits and pieces that seem to be present when people are within their various institutional places and playing their various institutional roles. Nor can the everyday non-institutionalized portions of people's lives be at all inferred from the conditions of their institutional moments and periods.

What is it that we urban planners look to today when trying to make an assessment of or understand a city, or the problems of a city? Although an urban planner's functions today include recommendations about the most appropriate locations for the buildings and other facilities of the various institutionally discrete "services" such as education, actually they often are not concerned or are only marginally concerned with such matters, compared to

their traditional concern with what is seen as more economically consequential matters such as housing and transportation. In referring to the major and much acclaimed Cleveland Policy Planning Report done by the urban planners there in the early 1970's, Norton Long makes the point that,

> It is odd that the Report says nothing about the city's schools or its other public services. These are serious public investments.[17]

In fact, is it not precisely in the institutional growth and development of places that we find the core meaning of the city throughout history? Are not cities precisely those places of location of the best facilities that a particular civilization's institutions offers? Is not the standard of excellence of cities the location therein of the best institutional accomplishments in education, in art, in music, in the economy, in the polity, in religion, et al? Do we not think that cities are something less than superior, or not even cities, if they do not possess the great university, the grand museums, the gigantic churches, the major corporations?

This is, indeed, part of our modern mode of thinking. But what, we suggest, ought to be crucial is the richness of the everyday life that exists in cities at every historical level of institutionalization. It is not sufficient to see in cities those institutional entities. In fact, it is distorting to understand universities, museums, churches, corporations, governments or whatever as other or more than people living in a physical environment that has meaning, past or present (or future) only

as people make it meaningful.[18] Moreover, our sense of history suggests that a rich everyday life is not only compatible with grand institutional creations and constructions but that they are found usually together. This is not to suggest that the everyday life need be democratic or free of authoritarian domination, because historically that is not true. Even in the marvelous medieval cities of Italy the rule was always oligarchic and usually aristocratic. It is actually possible to make the case that it is a rich everyday life that is vital for further institutional development.

Modern institutional understandings and practices, to the contrary, do have characteristics that work against a rich everyday life. For the same reasons, problems of cities or in cities are understood in the equally constricting and distorting modern partialized terms. Notice how those same Cleveland planners have put it:

> The Report concludes that the problems of Cleveland and its people have less to do with land uses, zoning and issues of urban design--the traditional domain of city planners--and more to do with personal and municipal poverty, unemployment, neighborhood deterioration and abandonment, crime, inadequate mobility, and so on.[19]

People do, indeed, enter the purview of the Cleveland planners, but in terms of the partialized and partializing institutional conceptions of them, usually in terms of economic institutional understandings but sometimes in terms of the

sociologist's equally specialized and partialized categories. Nothing is said about the situation, the social or human situation, of people not financially impoverished. There seems to be a sense that money is the root of all goodness or, if lacking, of all evil. Herbert Gans, the sociologist and planner, in commenting on that, same Cleveland report agrees in the sense of commenting that apart from the poor:

> Other city residents, including middle class ones, have also suffered, of course, but my impression is that, as always, the rich have suffered the least.[20]

In fact, for most urban planners in Cleveland, as elsewhere, the untouchable portion of reality is the total system of the city and of the encompassing larger society, the nation-state, especially in regard to that total system's institutional fabric. Small reforms in that fabric are imaginable but to change it any substantial way is unthinkable. That it, or our permanent reconstruction and interpretation of it, contributes to the sufferings and unhappiness of all of us, to rich and poor not alike but certainly to both, is swept under the table or regarded as of secondary importance and for subsequent attention. This is, of course, a superb way to avoid having to cope with one's own responsibilities in contributing, however little, to that humanly increasingly harmful, specialized modernity.

Norton Long is a perceptive critic of modern understandings and approaches used in urban analysis. Witness his senses of the importance of people in building and maintaining neighborhoods,

and of ordinary people having
/ some everyday-life power; while intellectuals are assuming, wrongly he thinks and we agree, that cities *per se* are doomed to a condition of almost complete powerlessness.[21] We do sympathize with his sense that in modernity a set of people living in a so-called city without any potency vis-a-vis its economy is difficult to visualize. But notice how his institutional sense leads him to emphasize the importance of schools to a city essentially in economic terms:

> There is no reason to believe that education could not be beneficial to the city's economy... In principle, there is no reason why high schools and, for that matter, elementary schools should not teach useful and usable knowledge. If planning is, as some economists maintain, the systematic management of assets, then city planners should ask searching questions about why the investment in education, the investment in human capital, should be so grossly misdirected and so lacking in pay-off.[22]

Long is correct in implying the traditional concern of city planners to be one of concern with the economy, albeit a concern not so much with the future of the city's economy as with the economic welfare of the corporations operating in the city, usually increasingly foreign to the city in their management and control. As Frances Fox Piven, a political scientist and planner, put it:

> Planners were committed to the values of growth

> and development, and to the economic and political interests in the city that prospered through growth and development. Planners did indeed take sides, and they took sides with the powerful, with the city builders.[23]

Nor were planners ever responsible for the big decisions, those that,

> "accounted first for the huge concentrated agglomerations of our older industrial cities, and then for the subsequent evisceration of these cities as capital moved to the outlying rings and to the new cities of the south and were based on oil, autos, electronics, and aerospace... (These) were never decisions embodied in any plans made by planners...At most, planners only struggled to service the cities built by private capital with the support of public capital."[24]

* * *

City planners, then, were themselves subject to an institutionalization process that gave them a particular place in the world, a world they were taught to see and understand as one of discrete even if overlapping and super-human institutions. Their special competence was to be in regard to land use and physical development, with the uses of land and the matter of physical development seen through those modern complex institutional lenses.

A British sociologist, R.E. Pahl, put the matter this way in the late sixties.[25] The planner, for understandable reasons, is "simply the tool of the elite." Pahl saw that in

America "the profession is becoming politicized", one part wanting social planning to be used progressively, another part conservatively, and a third part uncertain how to move in order to serve all interest groups, the public interest so defined. Recognizing that "all planning is social planning", the planner also knows or should know that "the amelioration of one problem brings about a deterioration in another sphere, for he is dealing all the time with symptoms not causes". Although "the planner cannot be the deus ex machina of the urban condition":

> he might wish to suggest quite other solutions, even if it were outside his scope to implement these solutions. The danger is that his regard for his professional position will make him disregard the most relevant policies in favour of policies within his field of competence.[26]

The city planner's scope, his field of competence, his institutionalized place in the world is our immediate problem. How can the city planner break through those boundaries and understand how to act professionally and politically in such a way as to acknowledge his essentially political nature, as Pahl correctly insists inheres in the nature of planning?

Herbert Gans suggests that what is in order, particularly in cities where the slowdown or cessation of economic growth, or actual economic contraction, seems to be the long-term future condition, is "planning for the static and even declining city."[27] What he calls "cutback planning" must replace the growth-planning of the past.

> The most important issue in cutback planning is, of course, who should bear the major costs, financial and otherwise.[28]

Gans, being a sensitive, liberal person, thus endorses "planning for the benefit of the poor," because it is the poor who do suffer the most when economic conditions deteriorate.

But the real problem for urban planners in trying to develop a new, integrated political-professional planning role is also, according to the further counsel by Gans, how to avoid politics. Let us examine his position carefully because he is not only a clear thinker but extremely influential currently in matters of urban planning policy and in the profession.

Gans suggests that before planners can learn how to plan for static and declining cities,

> they must learn how to think, and think constructively, about such cities, understanding how they function, and identifying the consequences of stasis and decline so as to determine what problems follow upon these consequences.[29]

This seems to be sensible but the problem with it is twofold.

One part of the problem is that Gans already has a conception of a functional model of cities, however general and vague it may be. His ontology, as that of most analysis, consists of elements that are institutions or at the sub-institutional but still institutionally defined levels. That includes persons defined in the partialized institutional terms of the kind used

by Jay Forrester, as but one of thousands of possible examples.[30] Forrester uses as his basic elements for urban systems analysis fictional, juridicial persons; that is, corporations or businesses at various age stages, physical buildings defined in the narrowest functional housing and economic class terms, and real human beings but defined only in terms of their partialized economic institutional roles.

Total persons are not really in the model of Gans' city either, although to his credit he does not partialize as much or in the same way as Forrester. Nor does he make his basic elements of the city the completely non-human "individual" of much economic and political science analysis.

The second part of the problem is the alleged need for the planner to avoid politics. Let us see how Gans puts it:

> The Cleveland planners have not fallen into the trap that sometimes awaited planners who realized they were participating in the political process; they have not tried to become politicians, for they have neither the constituencies and power base nor the training to play that role. The (Cleveland) Report correctly sees the planner's role as providing "information, analysis, and policy recommendations" to the city's political leadership.[31]

Acknowledging that they have gone far beyond technicians answering the questions of politicians, he gives them credit for actively framing and answering the important questions. He also applauds

them for understanding the city correctly as an aggregate of interest and client groups rather than "seeing the people of the city as isolated individuals".

Thus, we have in Gans a person who sees an important role for urban planners that is not narrowly technical. But it is not political in the modern political institutional sense of party politics, nor does Gans urge urban planners to try to enlarge or transform that conventionally limited institutional definition. In fact, Gans accepts the dominant conception of American city (as national) politics as one of contending interest groups whose identities are set by accepted institutional definitions. The planner is not expected by Gans to reject or try to change those institutional definitions, nor the institutional matrix from which they come.

Instead, his is a view of the urban planner playing a special kind of political role, not that of the party politician, but as an active influential in a kind of two-step flow of influence model of politics. Urban planners are to be among the opinion leaders that Columbia political sociologists such as Lazarsfeld and Merton found to be so important in decision-making about everything from buying consumer products to electing presidents. They should be actively committed influentials, committed to helping primarily those least able to help themselves, and committed to a kind of "redistributive approach to urban decision-making". Gans is fearful that there will be a return to planning that supports, as it always did, the interests of business and other powerful groups in Cleveland. Fox Piven

is afraid that Cleveland's planners will fail for the reason that the powerful decision-makers who will determine that city's fate in future are no longer resident there and therefore beyond the potential influence of the planners there.

Thus, in the case of Gans we do not find him advocating an innovative or even much enlarged political role for planners; to the contrary. He applauds their effort to gently exercise an almost non-political or quasi-political, quasi-technical role of trying to help the poor, but he is dubious that they will succeed. Piven's counsel is one of even greater scepticism, almost of pessimism, and not really more innovative. Her question is whether city planners can use their "skills in analysis and data-gathering" as countervailing "political resources" in the service of the working class and poor. When as in the financial crisis of New York thousands of the poor are cut from the city's public services as employed and as recipients, she and Richard Cloward counsel a politics of open protest and confrontation.[32]

really cannot expect many planners to join the poor in such undignified yet conventional tactics. Thus, we find the best of the planners, Gans and Fox Piven, entrapped by their inability to imagine, or by their finding it too unrealistic to advocate, another kind of city life than we in modernity have made and, thus, a qualitatively different kind of role for planners than their institutionally-defined ones, even if the latter come to be more liberal than conservative.

Vincent Ostrom, a political theorist of decentralization and of so-called democratic administration, takes the view that what

is crucial in urban government is to take into account, to a much greater degree than is now done, diverse citizen preferences for public goods and services.[33] He would share with Gans and others the view that planners ought to concentrate on what people, often inarticulate or ignored, especially the poor, actually prefer to have, rather than to have politicians or the powerful impose their own preferences on everyone. Ostrom says:

> Since an objective understanding of citizen preferences or utilities is impossible, mechanisms permitting diverse elements of the population to express preferences are also important for decision-makers concerned with advancing people's welfare.[34]

Although perhaps more sceptical than Gans about professionals generally, and urban planners particularly, Ostrom would seem to agree that it is especially important for public officials to help clarify existing alternatives; to help minimize the cost to citizens of information about such alternatives.[35] Despite charges of "conservatism", and the truly deep conservatism of some of the company that he keeps, we believe that Ostrom is as concerned with the plight of the poor and/with having public officials attentive to their needs as most orthodox liberal reformers. His conservatism is something other and is basically no different from that of his opponents who reject the so-called public choice approach in favor of more centralized national planning and decision-making.

The conservatism lies in their all accepting the authoritative institutional understanding. Ostrom would no more do

away with professional city planners than Martin Mayerson, although the latter would make them much more subject to national planning.[36] Ostrom's assumptions and model of man has relatively rational individuals acting as little decision-making machines, weighing alternative possibilities and comparing them to their preferences, making choices, and doing so at the cost of acquiring information. These are not assumptions strange to the likes of Herbert Simon or other decision-theorists who disagree very much with the public choice advocates. But we find them wrong assumptions that, worse, are misleading.[37] They are misleading because they focus centrally on what should not be central, namely, on such things as the reduction of costs of information and on making better decisions in terms of pleasing more people, and/or in terms of some other systemic function such as the avoidance of too much conflict or instability, or whatever.

These better decisions always concern some future state of affairs, usually in a rather distant futures, and rarely if ever the present, the now, the immediate future that is encompassed by the present. Given the dual concern with the dynamics of choosing and of choosing among matters never of present but always of future moment, it is little wonder that few decisional theorists argue about the relative qualities of human experiences that occur during choice-making or even choice-avoiding, or during whatever other things people may be doing other than acting as individual decision-makers.

The issue tends to be one of whether politicians and professionals (such as planners) will make the decisions at more central

levels of political-governmental institutional decision-making or at more local levels. There is a presumed diversity of public goods and services offered at the more numerous local levels, so that people may have greater choices in the sense of more alternatives to fight for, to attain their preference, by moving if necessary. If the choice-making system is truly federal, the public choice advocates intend to offer both an even greater variety of public choices to citizens and more responsive, responsible decision-making by officials who must share their power with other officials. Consolidation to them is an unnecessary, unwarranted, less efficient and less effective way of organizing the kind of local governmental institutional divisions that we have known so long by the word "fragmented". But there is really no fundamental disagreement over the necessity and goodness of the general representative semi-professional but specialized political-governmental institutions nor, indeed, of the diverse other sectors we have institutionalized as distinctively bounded domains for decision-making.

Although we do not think that Bish and Ostrom personally would resist a widescale opening of relatively closed, exclusive institutions to massive citizen participation therein, they do accept "for purposes of analysis", probably because they assume that the world will be that way for the foreseeable future, that "some individuals occupying specialized positions are assigned governmental prerogatives to determine, enforce and alter legal relationships".[38] They also accept, again for purposes of analysis, the authoritative conception of discrete institutional existence.

They accept as the priority the making of better decisions, although they would agree with Russell Ackoff, the systems and operations research analyst, that most problems cannot be solved but merely coped with.[39]

The operative assumption that information has costs is a very distorting conception. It misses what it is about information that is usually far more important than its so-called, often fictional, costs. Information not only often has more than compensating benefits in the cost-benefit sense. Information needs to be understood as part of a process of human experiencing and not as a product or good to be treated in a cost-benefit calculus. The surprise that occurs in the course of acquiring information, if acquiring is the right word to use, and the various other human experiential facets that are present when people generate knowledge or learn, which facets are often pleasing and always vital for people despite their seeming costs in time and energy, make an economistic approach to information in this context inappropriate.

In fact, the same Russell Ackoff has underlined that the important modern problem is not acquiring information on the values of people for better decisional solutions. Rather, it is the pleasures of participation itself that is the key value, the intrinsic process-related values of decision-making. According to Ackoff, decisional theorists or methodologists of problem-solving have concerned themselves with intrinsic values of decisional outcomes as well as with extrinsic values, that is, with instrumental objectives. However, "the intrinsic process-related

values of the problem solver are not incorporated into models of the decision-making process." How they can be incorporated is another way of asking how we can conceive of a truly participatory, truly opened, truly democratic process of urban planning as the priority rather than better decisions, even if more informed by knowledge of citizen preferences, which themselves may also be better informed, at least in some regards.

Given the hierarchical institutional models of our cities and of our societies that are current, is it any wonder that citizen participation has proved to be limited in every sense of the word, and as such most unsatisfactory for the people constrained to play such partialized and limited citizen roles? Let us cite Norton Long again, whose city-centered prescriptions tend to be of the deviant, decentralized variety, even if not of the Ostrom public choice kind. Norton Long's general model sounds in some ways as not at all deviant:

> It is important to see the city as a structure of differentiated roles organized so as to produce desired outcomes. The roles have to be filled with people who are competent and motivated to fill them.[40]

For this, Long argues that,

> The city is not an equalitarian dump heap of individuals, but an organized effort to attain a variety of objectives. The city is a community to the extent its members share many, if not all, of the objectives that are pursued in and by the

> city. Its principle of legitimacy is grounded in the appreciation of the contribution its various members make to the common purpose, and the justification of differential rewards (to the extent they are justified) depends on the perceived difference of the value of differing contributions, and the need for incentives to induce the contributions.[41]

His basic deviance comes in his suggesting that the planner can ... should participate in helping cities become powerful rather than remain powerless, especially in regard to the local economy:

> A realistic consideration of what it would take to move from the city's present condition to a more viable local economy with a more productively employed population would provide a sounder planning perspective. The equality of self-respect and the respect of others that is entailed by the performance of a meaningful role in a self-supporting city would indeed be a worthy and not unrealistic goal for planners to entertain. To entertain such a goal one must reject the definition of the city as powerless. This is as morally degrading for a city as for a person. Such a definition leads to sentimental attitudinizing over the poor rather than a vigorous and cognitively competent effort toward their

self-help.[42]

In our view his is a necessary deviance in the sense of rejecting the current modern belief that the "imperatives" of the larger system(s) demand cities to be actually non-city places of powerlessness, wherein their inhabitants share no purposes except to have a decent place to hang their hats, earn their livings, and consume the various goods and services. On the other hand, his deviance is insufficient and actually very limited. He asks the planner to contribute to revitalizing cities, especially through revitalizing their local economies, a prescription that the Carter administration seems to have found as difficult to follow as have planners; or even to understand concretely what they are to do. Instead of beginning to list important values, such as life, respect, security, jobs and income, and then trying to assess how short of realization they are, as he suggests for the concrete first step, or even re-zoning and otherwise trying to keep low-wage industry in the city or induce it to return, another of his suggestions, we urge the planner to start in a different place and with a different method.

We suggest that planners start with their own profession. We suggest that they subject themselves and their colleagues to a critical self-examination, directed to the question of what it is they do that many other people, assuming opportunities, could not do as competently. The corollary and even more important question would be what it is they do that other people could do with them (or even without them). And by this we do not mean that other people could be better providers of infor-

mation about what they, the people want, than the planners who then would make the decisions about what people will have. That is the usual kind of citizen participation opportunity provided, when it is provided. Nor do we mean that people might be better voters on a set of alternatives provided by the planners, another variant of what is usually meant when citizen participation is spoken about.

But this kind of methodology needs to take place in the context of the planners' effort at understanding the qualities and the character of their cities, which, given the brute fact of constantly passing time, means of course posing the question historically as well as empirically. Given the conception of the city offered earlier on, this means that planners must try to obtain a sense of what the everyday life of people living in and using their cities is like and, indeed, something of the kinds and qualities of the institutionalized portions of the lives of these same people--as well as how everyday life and institutionalized life fits together.

In all of these efforts to know what the lives of their fellows are like in their city, as well as what their own professional practices are really all about, and how openable they are, city planners have a choice. They may do this by themselves, by playing at being or actually becoming sociologists, peering at subjects or questioning respondents, or trying to do this <u>with</u> people, with people as their teachers and they as pupils, if they insist initially on conceiving their actions in terms of institutional definitions. Because labels are sometimes useful

as well as being reassuring that a new activity is not so idiosyncratic as to be without a name, we term the kind of practice we are proposing for planners a maieutic role. The word is taken from Socrates who presumably used the method it denotes: one of helping people understand what they already know.[43] It may be regarded as a kind of educational or philosophic method, depending upon what primary institutional affiliation Socrates is assumed to have had!

Actually, we regard this method as basically political--as well. Rejecting the usual institutional distinctions as well as those used only for so-called analytic purposes, which themselves are political in aim as in implementation, we certainly agree that city planners are ordinarily acting politically as planners. Although institutionally regarded and self-regarding as administrative rather than as political people, planners are one or the other depending only on the perspectives with which they act and/or are perceived.[44]

But there is still something more involved in the maieutic planning process we suggest that planners initiate. And it is they rather than others who must initiate it, lest the process be still-born or distorted because it is commanded instead of voluntarily entered. Those who must make the first steps are we professionals who are keepers of the keys, rituals, robes and other secret matters of our special institutional specialties.

What else is involved is the need for planners to enter into an examination of the city with another eye and a third ear. That other eye and ear are seeing and hearing, however slightly

and imprecisely, another way of life than the pursuit of loneliness of which Philip Slater speaks.[45] Not only are we suggesting that they enter politically as planners, and not take on the usually distinctive "other role" of politician when so doing. We are suggesting that they enter as political radicals, although that word has a terribly bad connotation for most planners today.

Why as political radicals? Because in order to inform and shape the Socratic kind of dialogue we propose that planners engage in with people, to find out what life is really like in their cities, they must have a vision, an alternative vision, a radically different vision of possible cities. It is a vision wherein the partializing, fragmenting institutions, that is the central characteristic of today's urban places, are no longer such.

To speak of urban or city renewal or redevelopment has the wrong connotations. We are not proposing that American cities be returned to the kinds of conditions that existed before the present degrees of destruction. While the physical fabric may have been better and the social problems less widespread and severe, the socio-physical and political fabric was of the modern institutional kind that was producing the disintegrating kinds of human isolation and separation from each other. Rather than speaking of city-rebuilding, renewal or redevelopment, we should rather speak of city-building, city-creation, city-construction and, in those senses, city design and city-planning. What is needed in this country of such underdeveloped cities are not new towns or new towns within cities, but qualitatively new cities.

Cities are better places than non-city urban sprawls or blobs or megalopolis, ceteris paribus. Cities at the human scale are an ambient caused by and in turn facilitating communities of creative, pleasing human sociality.

At the center of this radical alternative vision are cooperative human projects that can be carried forward as effectively and more humanly even if, perhaps, less efficiently than present modes of institutional organization. Involved in the latter are command structures that depend not usually on coercion but on acquiescence by people to play specialized but humanly distorting roles consistent with and rationalized by a model of man that is not anymore a good and truthful model.[46] What we have in mind can perhaps be expressed by speaking of an everyday life fabric that encapsulates the fabric of institutional life. Enriching communitarian, socially-binding everyday life experiences will become the dominant experiences, in contrast to today's domination by divisive and humanly crippling institutional experiences.[47] Specialization will not disappear, nor will diverse and differentiated interests and interest groups. But they will exist within encompassing communities and subcommunities and in a city context.

An apparently similar model of the kind we have in mind for cities already exists in the corporate kind of Japanese industrial development that has reached new heights in the postwar era. So, too, has it occurred in other countries. Anthony Sampson has said this of the present situation of British workers:

> The company or the office becomes a social center

> as much as a means of production. If one wants to find the modern equivalent of the eighteenth-century English village, one will find it not in the elegant cottages of middle-class commuters or the pretty seaside villages favored by retired professional people, but in the office buildings and factories which have built up their own communal societies. The personnel officers, the secretaries, the mail rooms and the office canteens have taken over the social roles of the clergymen, the extended families and the great houses that were the bases of the old English village. It is banishment from this community as much as the deprivation of work that constitutes the cruelty of unemployment.[48]

But these similarities are misleading. They are not communities of opened institutions wherein the members are participating as total people in an everyday life space that encompasses institutional life space. To the contrary, in these kinds of "humanized" communities, the everyday life space is planned and programmed in such a way that it fits, and in a supportive way, the "structure of differentiated roles organized so as to produce desired outcomes", economically defined, to use Norton Long's phrase.

These modern versions of more corporate kinds of communities found in earlier times are hierarchical relative to participation in decision-making by people, and in a way that has no more

merit than the hierarchical oligarchic-aristocratic structures of participation in medieval cities. People are not given, nor do they take, opportunities to participate in communal matters in modernity. Those matters often have become subject not to decisions of the powerful in and of the community but of the powerful in the institutional organizations that control the divided fabric of modern life. And sometimes those matters have become the responsibility of no one. But when these modern corporate enterprises are run by economically powerful people, there is little likelihood of their opening their own power structure to mass participation, nor those of the other institutions necessary for the successful operation of theirs.

In fact, one of the major reasons that we think of planners adopting a maieutic role as one of the first professional groups that can do so is that the city is a particularly appropriate place for the institutionally-opening process of which we speak. In our judgement, people such as Henri LeFebyre and David Harvey are correct in understanding the modern city to be a place rivaling that of the factory in its economic importance.[49] More importantly, the city or non-city urban place is the locational place of the range of institutions necessary to be opened for a new kind of society to emerge. When city planners begin to act maieutically, they cannot fail to concern themselves with opening up schools as well as hospitals as well as local government and the local economy, because these are all integral to the multi-faceted human experiences that we have ripped apart and distorted by our ill-conceived institutional

differentiations. We would hope that they would quickly be joined by other sets of institutional professionals and specialists who also understood that they had a maieutic role to play together with others.

Our point, to repeat it here, is that specializations can and should exist, lest we attempt to build an uninteresting, bland or worse homogeneous blob of a world. But that specialization can and should occur in community, indeed, city contexts, wherein the institutional distinctions are not divisive and disabling socially and personally, as they are increasingly today. Furthermore, a deep self-examination by any professional or institutionally specific group will reveal myriads of matters that can and should be opened to participation therein by people from other or from no institutional domain, which matters are restricted to decisional participation by the "appropriate" institutionally accredited people or by no one.

In this manner we foresee the creation of cities that will be better than those that existed in past. As an Italian urbanist, or merely as an Italian sensitive to the wonders of the medieval cities there, as well as a long-term resident of Venice, that city republic of so many marvels, including its ancient relatively democratic and human scale, I am tempted sometimes to be merely a reactionary. But trying to re-establish a lost past is futile. Moreover, it will not do to romanticize that past, lest opportunities for an even better future be lost. The middle ages of city-states, including the republic of Venice, were not participatory democracies. And they continued the development of institutionalization that we have taken so much further in

modernity, past the point of diminishing returns. It is participatory democracy in an opened and bridged, integrated and fused institutional fashion that we need, and that is possible to construct in our cities of the future. Urban design, so-called, is the avant garde subject in many urban planning programs in the United States and elsewhere today. Our intention is to proclaim that such an emphasis, or better, city design, can be a good development, if but only if it is approached with the intention of allowing all citizens to participate consciously in doing urban design, as indeed all citizens do, although so many are unaware of being planners.

One of the implications of what we have said so far is that the usual terminology used in speaking about so-called cities and urban places is rather inadequate. Central cities, suburbs, metropolitan areas, and the like are all candidates for the kind of city-building to which we have referred. Precisely because our vision is imprecise and points more to a process than to a structured form, a process of opening institutions and building a system of rich and enriching social experiences in an encompassing fabric of everyday life, we would not dare claim that this cannot be done in a particular kind of city, metropolitan or urban settlement. All places where people live are, in fact, places where cities can be built.

We would not disagree with Anthony Downs who argues for a policy of opening up the suburbs but with a single overall strategy for an entire metropolitan area.[50] He thinks that new institutions will be needed although not necessarily metro-

politan governments. We would agree that all metropolitan-area residents are interdependent in a politically meaningful way but we would go further. We would even say that since all Americans, at least, are interdependent in a socio-economically-politically-culturally (etc.) meaningful way but their present mode of institutional thinking and acting are producing more rather than less injustice as well as other human ills, a single overall national strategy of even greater innovativeness is in order. His concluding chapter on Making the Choice to open the suburbs is a powerful piece with much of which we agree. But since we also agree with his own scepticism if not pessimism, read between the lines, we would argue that trying to start maieutic planning has at least as much if not more chance of success than his more limited but equally drastic appeal for changes in traditional American perspectives.

* * *

We end by saying a word about what political scientists might do to assist the beginnings of a maieutic planning project relative to building new cities. Although that same Anthony Downs is or was professionally an economist, he is well enough known by political scientists to be considered a political economist if not political scientist, pure and simple. He may serve as the example of what might be done first by political scientists, especially those specializing on the politics or political analysis or political theory-construction of cities or communities or urban or state and local government, or whatever the special field is called. In his book Opening up the Suburbs, Downs starts

by rejecting the common-sensical and professionally shared judgements that "Urban development in America is...'chaotic' and 'unplanned' because it produces what many critics call 'urban sprawl'".[51] Instead of being haphazard, he argues that it occurs in a highly predictable manner and "leads to precisely the results desired by those who dominate it". And in the process there is created injustice for millions of Americans and the major problems in many central cities are exacerbated.

What is right and what is wrong with this approach as a model for other political scientists to follow? What is right is that Downs does try to understand at the largest, most general level the dynamics of "urban development" in such a way that his model can help him reject as wrong much of the conventional wisdom. This is good, because in order to think and act usefully the conventional shibboleths need to be re-examined carefully and many rejected.

What is also right in this approach is that it permits him to immediately raise and take a position on the moral issues involved, those of justice.[52] For unless that is done, policy recommendations either by implication or explicitly will contribute to the human problems involved and contribute to injustice. And political scientists must understand more than many seem to do now that their professional work, no matter how objective, scientific, and supposedly value-free, has immediate policy implications. As one of the necessary steps in a self-demystifying process, political scientists ought to examine carefully how their own work as professional political scientists contri-

butes to the kinds of thinking and actions that add further to the prospects for wrong kinds of policy by governments at least. And, of course, political scientists must clarify to themselves which kinds of city and urban environments they think are possible and wise to try to construct, and which to avoid, in order to ask the question of how to do so.

We think that what is wrong with Downs' approach is his very initial assumption also that most of America has "good quality neighborhoods". This is the usual comparison of the relatively peaceful, relatively peaceful suburb or even inner-city section with the crime-ridden, filthy and often increasingly deserted downtown slum. But it is not good enough for the comparison to be made in that manner. Perhaps because I teach in a department of history (of architecture and urban planning), or because I am simply a history-conscious Italian, I would like to see that evaluation put into a historical context. On the one side we do have the history of American cities, cities that have become less cities instead of more developed cities, with the passage of time, and especially within the past century or so. On the other side we do have the aforementioned world history, especially the history of the Old World and of its cities during the past several centuries. I believe that an evaluation in this context would prove to be very different from the one Downs makes.

In any event, this is also a plea for political scientists to become, if they are not already, historians. In order to work with and help urban planners in the maieutic role herein advocated, political scientists ought to join with urban planners in trying

to forge a vision of the possible and the better (if not of the perfect utopia) by, necessarily, becoming versed in the relevant history. And, of course, as political scientists begin to open themselves up and enter and become a bit familiar, at least, with the subject of these institutionally separated disciplinary domains, professionals in these fields / in turn can begin to open up themselves and their discipline to infiltration by others. The way towards a maieutic role by political scientists themselves is to shed increasingly their disciplinary defenses and begin to examine, with other professional academics, and/with practitioners and just plain people, the actual implications, the effects and the causes, of the institutional government and politics that they study so professionally. Certainly the plight of the cities or of the non-cities in the United States, and not only in the United States, is worthy of an effort by every professional person, but especially by those of us who specialize in such matters, to try to understand, so that we may come to act in a manner that will contribute towards the amelioration of increasingly horrible conditions of life.

NOTES (for Simona Ganassi's paper)

1. Among the people who have argued this thesis with power recently is Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1975).

2. Many Marxists find exactly this condition in liberal democratic capitalism. Workers not only are subject to incivility or a pseudo-civility in the factory or office, in terms of brutal or boring but always hierarchically authoritarian relations; they are also treated to the incivility of an everyday life wherein human beings are treated merely as consumers or potential consumers. Marx's own point was that capitalism and the division of labor and life were identical conditions or, if not identical, mutually necessary. Unfortunately, the modern institutional divisions with their internal hierarchies of institutional expertise have become as deep, fragmenting divisions in the so-called socialist states as in the modern capitalist world.

3. For example, it would be interesting and important to understand something more of the everyday life of Londoners to sense what was happening to London as a city when the first city-wide system of police was being established. Their pre-police incivility and often brutal everyday life patterns are sketched, although not in terms that are historically comparative with other English and European cities of that epoch, by Jonathan Rubenstein City Police (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1973).

   Henri Lefebvre has a number of important things to say about the concept of everyday life in his various important works. For English-only readers we cite his Everyday Life in the Modern World (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973).

4. Because we are not referring to the partialized "social" relations of most sociologists, the important and exciting work of deciding what is the most appropriate range and

contents of these social experiences still needs to be done.

5. The need for such a unification is nicely treated by David Harvey in Social Justice and the City (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), Chapter I.

6. N.H. Lithwick, Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects (A Report prepared for the Honourable R.K. Andras, Minister Responsible for Housing, Government of Canada, Ottawa, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1970), p. 15. This report served as the basic founding document of the subsequently established Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. Its modestly innovative institutional reforms were so quickly frustrated thereafter that Dr. Lithwick quickly resigned his post in the new Ministry.

7. Murray Stewart, Editor, The City: Problems of Planning (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), Introduction, p. 24.

8. N.G. Lithwick, op. cit.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 16.

11. We are aware that every thought or speech about people requires some kind of simplification, some kind of abstraction, some kind of abstract simplification of those people. But we are objecting not only to the unnecessarily extreme simplification ordinarily used in the more rigorously analytic approaches in the various social sciences, and also in the professions, but to the kind of distorted abstractions used when the models of people are not human experiential models but those of essentially discrete categories of needs or values.

12. N.H. Lithwick, op. cit.

13. See Simona Ganassi Agger, Urban Self-Management (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., forthcoming, 1978). (An expanded, revised edition of the Italian version Autogestione Urbana (Bari: Dedalo, 1977).

14. For an excellent summary of these and other approaches in community studies, see Morris Stein, The Eclipse of Community (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1969).

15. See for example Sam Bass Warner, Jr. The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968); and Richard Sennett Families Against the City: Middle Class Homes of Industrial Chicago 1872-1890 (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).

16. The works of Studs Terkel and of various urban anthropologists are useful but most are not guided exactly by the kinds of perspectives we suggest are most relevant for such reconstructions.

17. Norton E. Long, Another View of Responsible Planning, AIP Journal (September, 1975), p. 314.

18. Needless to say, this is not an idealist position.

19. Norman Krumholz, Janice M. Cogger and John H. Linner, "The Cleveland Policy Planning Report", AIP Journal (September, 1975), p. 298.

20. Herbert J. Gans, "Planning for Declining and Poor Cities", AIP Journal (September, 1975), p. 307.

21. See also his "Have Cities a Future?" Public Administration Review November-December, 1973, pp. 543-552.

22. Norton E. Long, AIP Journal, op. cit. p. 314.

23. Frances Fox Piven, "Planning and Class Interests", AIP Journal (September, 1975), 308.

24. Ibid.

25. R.E. Pahl, "Whose City?" New Society (January, 1969); reprinted in The City (ed. by Murray Stewart), op. cit., pp. 85-91.

26. Ibid., p. 90.

27. Herbert J. Gans, op. cit. p. 306.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

31. Herbert J. Gans, op. cit., p. 305.

32. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "The Urban Crisis as an Arena for Class Mobilization", Radical America, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 9-17.

33. See Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); Vincent Ostrom The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1973).

34. Vincent Ostrom, "Some Paradoxes for Planners", in The Politics of Planning (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1976) p. 249.

35. For their comments on professionals, see Bish and Ostrom, op. cit., pp. 80-1. A typical comment about costs of information is in the same work, p. 18.

36. See, for example, Martin Mayerson, "The Next Challenge for the Urban Planner", AIP Journal (January, 1977), pp. 371-76.

That Ostrom's is fundamentally the more radical position can be appreciated by the recent comment of two Marxists, namely: "The process of dismantling of centralized planning, dissociated from the associated producers...is part and parcel of the movement of the working class toward the abolition of management's domination and fragmentation of the labor process." Ranko Bon and Elise Bon-Rudin, "A Note Toward a Critique of Braverman's Labor and Monopoly Capital" (mimeo graphed paper available from the Urban Planning Institute of Slovenia, Jamova 18, 61000 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia), p. 9. They continue: "This, naturally, applies equally well to the post-revolutionary societies where the means of production were nationalized, but where the revolution stopped short of inaugurating the process of gradual transfer of control back to the associated producers."

37. Sometimes, in fact often, wrong assumptions may prove to be very useful. That, in fact, has been the case with much of the thinking about institutions in the past.

38. Bish and Ostrom, op. cit. p. 18.

39. Russell L. Ackoff, "Beyond Problem Solving", General Systems Yearbook of the society for General Systems Research, Vol. XIX, 1974 (ed. by Anatol Rapoport) (Washington, D.C.: Society for General Systems Research, Lisner Hall, 2023 G. Street, N.W.), pp. 237-240.

40. Norton E. Long, AIP Journal, op. cit., p. 316.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. In Webster's Dictionary (Third International), maieutic is an adjective defined as: of or relating to the dialectic method practiced by Socrates in order to elicit and clarify

the ideas of others. We suggested elsewhere that we would only add: and of his own ideas.

44. This is suggested explicitly in Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 48. We thank Ranko Bon and Elise Bon-Rudin for reminding us of the work of Alfred Sohr Rethel to be found, for example, in Praxis (International Edition), Vol. V, No. 1-2, op. cit. Although disagreeing absolutely with Rethel's view of socialist education as (only) achievable under the guidance and as part of the proletarian dictatorship instituted by a revolutionary party, we agree with much of Rethel's argument. We believe that maieutic planning is essential to bring about a socialized labor process. We agree with Bon and Bon-Rudin that organization is required and that maieutic planning must take some kinds of organizational forms although we doubt that they would find it either sufficiently revolutionary or working class-oriented. But we do not expect that it will or should take place within the political party form, revolutionary or otherwise, of modern institutionalized society. We also agree with Bon and Bon-Rudin who imply clearly that it is the Yugoslav form of self-governing socialism that has some lessons for those who believe that modern scientific-technological-automated industrial production cannot be put to less exploitive purposes but disagree with them in two ways. First, to the extent that they imply that the Yugoslav success was a repeatable one under the banner of a revolutionary party we disagree. The Yugoslav success happened partly because it was such a backward, underdeveloped and not so highly institutionalized country when it began to happen. Secondly, a new kind of fetishism seems to have developed, even in Yugoslavia, as well as in the so-called post-revolutionary societies, which is a fetishism not of managers but of professionals, of experts, including urban planners. And there has not yet

occurred a re-thinking of the traditional institutional boundaries in which these experts operate, making it doubly difficult to break through the unnecessary multiple hierarchies that still divide labor and life in post-capitalist circumstances.

45. Philip Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point (Boston, Beacon Press, 1970).

46. That model is criticised in Robert E. Agger, A Little White Lie: Divisions of Labor and Life (New York: Elsevier, 1978). From a rather different perspective the model is sharply although inferentially criticised by Ernest Gellner in his "A Social Contract in Search of an Idiom", Political Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 2 (April-June, 1975), pp. 127-52.

47. In an interesting piece, Sir Geoffrey Vickers argues for the need for more social bonding, not in the sense of bondage or in the context of (somehow) citizens becoming more committed to the social whole, especially to the governmental institutions representative of that social whole. See the special number edited by Roystan Landau, "The Individual in an Institutionalized World", Architectural Design (AD), London, February, 1976.

48. Anthony Sampson, "The most Dangerous Extravagance", Newsweek, August 22, 1977, p. 17.

49. See Henri Lefebvre, La révolution urbaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1970); and David Harvey, op. cit. Harvey is a bit dubious about Lefebvre's proposition concerning the supremacy or at least parity of the urban network to that of the industrial, but is generally sympathetic to Lefebvre's point and thinks the trend is in that direction.

50. Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973).

Although we feel that Downs did not treat sufficiently deeply the various, perhaps increasingly undifferentiable, patterns of American neighborhood living in terms of meanings for their inhabitants, especially by using the term middle-calss as sufficient to distinguish people so labeled from the low-income or moderate income, his approach focuses precisely on the importance of everyday life. Notice his definition of his key concept: "Common to all of the many definitions of the term neighborhood is the idea that people living in the same neighborhood continually interact with one another in their daily lives." p. 88. Unfortunately we find his equally important conception of a viable neighborhood very inadequate. pp. 88-9.

51. Ibid., p. 1.

52. Ibid., Chapter 16, 171-86. David Harvey's work is entitled Social Justice and the City, much as Downs might have entitled his book The Social Justice of Opening Up the Suburbs. Harvey's model is finally a Marxist model and leads him to make different kinds of recommendations than Downs, but both acknowledge that justice is what their professional work is all about.

53. Downs' conception of a "viable neighborhood" we find very inadequate, even if its intent seems to be merely one of providing for a survival level of living, lacking in so many of the ghettoes and slums of American cities. Unless and until we articulate something more of the human relations than he does in conceiving even of survival situations, we will not be able to understand how to bring those about, nor to find out how to locate the arrow of progress for all the people who deserve the human right of engaging creatively in city-building.